Strike while the iron is hot: Why the West must strengthen collaboration with BRICS+ countries and the Global South while it can

Source: Reuters/Maxim Shemetov

The first BRICS+ summit, hosted by Russia on October 22-24, 2024, will formally expand the group to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, reflecting a shift toward a world that amplifies the voice of the Global South. Despite internal rivalries and diverse national interests, the group aims to champion the priorities of the developing world. As BRICS+ expands, it is crucial for Western countries to seize the opportunity to engage with the Global South and address the perception of marginalized voices in global governance before it is too late. Strengthening ties with the Global South is essential for the West to effectively navigate the future geopolitical landscape for decades to come.

From October 22 to 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin will host the first-ever summit of BRICS+ in the Russian city of Kazan. This 16th BRICS meeting marks the official beginning of a significant expansion announced a year earlier in Johannesburg, formally welcoming five new members into the group: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This expansion is promoted as an effort to build alternatives to Western-led international institutions and create a multipolar order, giving greater prominence to the perspectives of the Global South. The 15th BRICS Summit Declaration evinced growing dissatisfaction with a perceived outdated global economic governance system failing to reflect the needs and voices of emerging economies.

The BRICS+ is a political force that ought to be reckoned with. Together, the ten BRICS+ members account for  45% of the world's population, 47% of global crude oil production, and 28% of the world's economic output. This formidable economic bloc wields the potential to act on its ambitions to reform the global political landscape. As outlined by a BCG report, the BRICS+ could make a significant global impact by creating an alternative development finance system, establishing a parallel energy trading system, deepening trade networks among members, reducing reliance on the dollar for foreign exchange transactions, and deepening technology cooperation.

The BRICS+ fractured alliance in pursuit of global influence

Notwithstanding its potential, skepticism remains about the ability of BRICS+ to function as a premier political institution, stemming from the diversity of its members' economic models, political systems, cultural contexts, and national interests. Persistent tensions among its members also undermine the group's cohesion. Iran and Saudi Arabia have a deeply rooted history of conflict, fueled by a struggle for regional hegemony and dominance of the Muslim world, often referred to as a new Cold War in the Middle East. India and China face a deteriorating relationship, plagued by persistent border disputes in the Himalayan region, unbalanced trade relations, increasingly difficult ties between China and Pakistan, and a collision of their envisioned geopolitical positions in Asia and beyond. Egypt and Ethiopia are locked in a feud over the fair distribution of the River Nile's water resources. Their relations are further strained by a diplomatic dispute over Ethiopia's calculated recognition of the independence of the breakaway region of Somaliland in exchange for access to the Red Sea to circumvent its landlocked condition, and the security agreement between Egypt and Somalia concluded in response. These internal frictions constitute obstacles to finding consensus on common political issues, hindering the evolution of BRICS+ into a dominant force in global politics.

Moreover, while the expansion of BRICS+ offers the group an opportunity to position itself as the champion of the Global South, it may also be a source of vulnerability. South Africa has announced that more than forty countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, of which twenty-two have formally applied for admission. However, accepting dozens of diverse countries as new members will inevitably complicate consensus-building and decision-making within the group, increase its heterogeneity, and generate dissonance within the political concert it seeks to create. The absence of specific criteria for admission to the group or of any obligation to adhere to a well-defined common agenda risks diluting its weak coherence, blurring the lines between this new political force and existing multilateral groupings with limited influence, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.

The BRICS+ have yet to formulate and pursue a unified policy, basing their political identity on what they oppose – namely, the dominance of Western powers over international institutions and global governance – rather than what they stand for. This is reflected in the inherently divergent perceptions among member countries about the role the BRICS+ should play in international politics. While China, Russia, and the newly accepted Iran aspire to transform the group into an anti-Western project, most BRICS+ members are reluctant to join a political bloc of open confrontation with the West. This dissonance is a constraining factor for the BRICS+ in their aspiration to match the G7. As one Chinese economist pointed out, the G7's influence comes from its ability to "speak with one voice," which allows the organization to profoundly shape global politics. This common voice is far from discernible in the BRICS+'s political discourse.

The BRICS+ also lacks a coherent and united representation in the broader context of multilateral frameworks. The group, as such, is not a member of any international organization, and its own members pursue divergent objectives as individual international actors. This contrasts with other international blocs, such as the European Union, which plays an essential role in international organizations helping to shape global norms by leveraging its economic and political power and common foreign policy. The EU also engages with the BRICS+ countries individually instead of considering the group as a whole, reflecting the BRICS+'s failure to be recognized as a coherent global actor on the public stage.

Moreover, the BRICS+ group is dominated by China, whose economy is larger than that of all the other members combined. The group's recent expansion has primarily been driven by China, which is trying to increase its global influence by courting emerging economies and countries traditionally allied with the United States. By taking a more confrontational path with the West, China sees the BRICS group as an "insurance policy" against international isolation, drawing emerging economies into its orbit. China's assertive political stance thus risks drawing the group into greater geopolitical tensions, transforming it into a vector for bipolar confrontation. However, the leading BRICS+ countries are not ready to become China's vassals in its quest for a more inclusive global order. This is reflected in India's and Brazil's resistance to further expansion, fearing it would dilute their influence and strengthen China's power by aligning countries with Beijing's agenda. These nations have no interest in global fragmentation or being caught in the middle of a geopolitical rivalry, but rather seek inclusive and productive multilateral diplomacy.

Finally, the BRICS+ countries hope to free themselves from their over-dependence on the US dollar, but they have struggled to make it happen. The BRICS+ countries see de-dollarization as critical in their effort to reshape the global economic system. Brazilian President Lula da Silva asked, "Why does Brazil need the dollar to trade with China or Argentina? We can trade in our currency." In addition to trade, efforts to dethrone the dollar's ​​dominance also stem from vulnerability to Western economic sanctions, a concern shared by most BRICS+ countries, regardless of their political orientation. The BRICS+ countries have condemned the use of global financial and payment systems as instruments of geopolitical contestation and have proposed a range of solutions, from expanding the use of currencies other than the dollar to creating a BRICS+ currency. However, the national currencies of the BRICS+ countries face significant limitations in terms of increased cross-border use and concerns about their convertibility and volatility. The Chinese renminbi is by far the most widely used currency among the BRICS. However, its global use is hampered by the limited amount of renminbi available outside China, by Chinese policies limiting the convertibility of the renminbi, and by the reluctance of countries to submit to Chinese dominance. Creating a monetary union among the BRICS countries would also depend on developing a common approach to economic policy, including agreements on debt and public spending limits and broad macroeconomic convergence, which is, as things stand, highly unlikely. Since the dollar is still used in over 80% of world trade, providing a reliable and stable monetary alternative for global transactions seems out of reach.

A call for the West to engage in building a cooperative future with the countries of the South

Although the BRICS+'s capacity to generate coherent and convergent policies remains limited, the group's rise should give Western governments pause. Indeed, BRICS+ is a manifestation of the desire of the countries of the South to be better represented and have a more significant influence on the architecture of global governance and the financial institutions that concern them. The BRICS+'s great appeal to emerging economies and developing countries is a reminder of the risks of ignoring the legitimate demands of the countries that make up the international community. Rejecting or resisting these demands instead of working to meet them will only exacerbate global divisions and allow revisionist powers to upend the current international order. Therefore, a farsighted Western approach would be to view the BRICS+ as both a catalyst and an opportunity to engage with important developing countries and create unity in the public arena. The West can promote cooperation with the countries of the South and discuss ways to improve the international economic and financial system to address global challenges and consider developing countries' concerns and interests. This would help dispel criticism of the current order and create unity around a shared system based on international norms.

In order to adapt to the inevitable changes on the international scene reflected by the rise of the BRICS+ movement, the European Union has developed a foreign policy position towards the group and other emerging powers. The document calls for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the BRICS+ countries, particularly with those that share and respect democratic values. Considering the BRICS+ as essentially political, despite their important economic dimension, the EU advocates for an adequate response to efforts to create alternative international organizations by intensifying partnerships with like-minded partners worldwide. 

A deeper political dialogue with the BRICS+ countries is necessary to sow the seeds of cooperation for decades to come and ensure the EU's global relevance in a constantly changing political environment. Developing and maintaining strong relations with the Global South is essential to nurture respect for international norms and collectively address global challenges. The West can attract many developing countries by giving them the opportunity to participate fully in the development of the global institutional order. This is the best way to maintain the West's position as a leader in global cooperation and ensure respect for the norms and rules governing the current international order.