Populism at and EU Foreign Policy: the case of Italy in a historical perspective

Introduction 

The latest Italian elections saw extensive popular support for populist forces and the consequential formation of Meloni’s government composed of a coalition of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) (Mudde, 2007) and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI). The current government is not the first case in which Italian elections resulted in a populistic challenge of the historical position of Italy in the European Union and the international system of alliances. Indeed, the Conte I government, which took office after the 2018 Italian national elections, was the first Western European government entirely formed by populistic and anti-establishment forces. 

For the sake of this essay, I will employ Cas Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism. He describes populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” According to this categorisation, populist parties embrace anti-elitism and anti-pluralism as ideological foundations. Moreover, Mudde (2004) defines it as a ‘thin-centered ideology.’ Thus, the policy conduct varies according to the party’s specific attached ideology, which is paramount for demarcating who belongs to the ‘true people.’ However, as many authors argue, the antagonistic juxtaposition between the populist party as the ‘only true representative of the people’ and the corrupt elites is the common denominator of any policy advocated by populists, including foreign policy. 

This essay will dissect the interdependence among international events, populist movements, and their attached foreign policy from an evolutionistic perspective, focusing on the Italian Second Republic, which for number, diversity, significance in the national and European debate, and the evidence of its foreshadowing role of international political trends, lends itself well to be the setting of this analysis. The first section will inspect the reasons behind the emergence of Berlusconism and how the Cavaliere changed the foreign policy view. The second section will link the Eurozone, the widespread of Euroscepticism in Italy, and the simultaneous rise of Lega per Salvini Premier (LSP) and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) peaking with Conte I cabinet, in which the two anti-establishment forces governed together for 15 months. The third and last section will analyze the current Italian government's positioning in the multipolar international setting. 

A Drastic Revolution in Foreign Policy: rise and decline of Berlusconi and Berlusconism 

This last year’s electoral boom of populist forces is the culmination of an Italian, long-standing tradition of populist leaders, parties, and movements. The Tangentopoli scandal and the originating collapse of the First Republic party system, combined with three major changes in international affairs (the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalization, and the Maastricht Treaty), fueled the spread of populism in the Second Republic. In 1994, only two months before the general elections, the famous billionaire media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi announced his ‘descent into the field’ and the foundation of his Forza Italia. Unexpectedly, he won, but he stayed at the head of the Italian government for only eight months (Berlusconi I). This brief period was clearly not enough to leave a profound impact on Italian institutions. However, Berlusconi I represented the start of Berlusconism, which has altered Italian politics and Italians' conception of politics. Indeed, the Cavaliere served as head of government four times (Berlusconi I 1994-1995; Berlusconi II 1996-1998; Berlusconi III 2001-2006; Berlusconi IV 2008-2011), has been the longest-serving prime minister and dominated the political debate for two decades. He described himself as the representative of the honest Italian workers opposing the corrupt and economically fruitless political elite, leveraging on the fact that he was not a professional politician. 

Berlusconi envisioned the potential domestic benefits of foreign policy. He understood the necessity of simplifying international questions so that they could exit the elitist diplomatic expertise and enter the public discourse. He used foreign policies as an extension of domestic ones. The 1990s international setting evolution incentivized this dynamic due to the blurred boundary between domestic and international realms. Indeed, the collapse of the bipolar world and the advent of economic globalization made security less salient in favour of trade, finance, migration, and the environment, which became highly relevant foreign policy issues. The birth of the European Union transferred much authority from the domestic level to the supranational European institutions. Berlusconi’s liberal populism (Diodato & Niglia, 2019) found its fuel in the interrelationships between Italian society, the European Union (EU), and international trade. Berlusconi portrayed Italian people as the ‘depositors of virtuous values’ (Diodato & Niglia, 2019). Foreign policy was the tool to promote – and protect – Italian economic interests in Europe and the world. 

The literature suggests that populist parties and leaders use foreign policy to create a point of rupture with the previous governments. Berlusconi, nevertheless, never challenged Italy’s historical alliances and membership in the EU. Yet, he believed that Italy should play a more prominent role in the EU and the international arena: he wanted to free Italy from the necessity of a vincolo esterno (external constraint) and enhance the Italian status as a middle power (Diodato & Niglia, 2019). He believed Italy - and Italians - did not need any model abroad. The Cavaliere always advocated for a more political Europe. He endorsed tighter coordination in Common Defense and Security Policy (Maastricht III pillar), especially after the Iraq crisis in 2003. Yet, he criticized the Eurozone, but never its existence but rather its governance and how economic policy – primarily austerity – has been imposed on Italy. Nonetheless, after the 2008 crisis, Berlusconi exacerbated this subtle - and unconventional - Euroscepticism in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. 

The Cavaliere approached diplomatic relations with his successful businessman mentality, revolutionizing foreign policy approach and communication. He revolutionized the role of the Italian prime minister, who became a statesman with centralized foreign policy power who, according to his mentality, had the primary goal of promoting Italian businesses abroad (Diodato & Niglia, 2019). In January 2002, Ruggiero resigned. Berlusconi became interim Minister of International Affairs and held the office for eight months. The length of the maintained position and the at-the-time international context (the beginning of the War on Terror) make this episode pivotal in understanding Cavaliere’s vision of his and, thus, the prime minister's role in international relations. As a businessman, Berlusconi privileged bilateralism over multilateral international fora. He affirmed the centrality of personal relations in international affairs. He cultivated personal friendships with Bush and Putin. In his narrative, he celebrated his ability 'to end the Cold War' with the Pratica di Mare summit thanks to his effort to create the preconditions for USA-Russia Dialogue and promote Russian inclusion in the major international fora (Diodato & Niglia, 2019). This attitude is illustrative of his desire to uphold Italian interests irrespectively of other considerations (e.g., the close relation with Putin’s Russia even after the Georgian Crisis (2008)) and outside the European context. However, the Cavaliere did not fulfil his goal of enhancing the Italian position in international affairs. Due to his scarce credibility, unconventional – disrespectful – diplomatic manners, sharp criticism, and stubborn resistance to austerity measures, he instead became guilty of Italian international isolation. 

Sovereignism, Anti-Establishment and Anti-EU: the chameleonic transformation of Lega per Salvini Premier and Movimento 5 Stelle 

The Eurocrisis and Monti’s policies fueled Troika-dictated populist rhetoric: for populist parties it was now clear how national institutions had been emptied of their sovereignty, and they had given authority away to Brussels’ straitjacket. Lega Nord (later – from 2017 – Lega for Salvini Premier) and the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) successfully capitalized on this anti-EU sentiment. 

The LN was founded back in 1992 as a regionalist populist party: it advocated the independence of Padania, the Norden Italy regions. In the early 1990s, the party positively viewed the creation of the European Monetary Union to promote Northern Italian businesses in Europe and give policy management to competent politicians, whom instead Rome had not. In the late 1990s, it shifted to Eurosceptic positions and sharpened the anti-migration rhetoric. After Berlusconi’s fall, LN was the only relevant party not supporting Monti’s government. During the technocratic cabinet, it successfully transposed the anti-elite and anti-national-establishment narrative to the European level: ‘Roma ladrona’ (‘Thieving Rome’) was no longer the subject of their harsh criticism, but new ‘evil’ was founded in the supranational European institutions and Paris and Berlin. However, the real turning point corresponds to Matteo Salvini’s election to party secretary. Salvini succeeded in nationalizing the party, and he brought the Lega closer to European radical right parties. 

Founded in 2009, the Movimento 5 Stelle presented itself as an anti-establishment, anti-elite party of people, escaping the categorization between Left and Right. Indeed, it has always been vocal against the corrupt Berlusconism and the institution-elitism of the Partito Democratico (PD). Many scholars described the M5S as a rare representation of a pure populist party. Yet, a more profound analysis reveals alignment with new-left-liberalism, at least for environmental and foreign policy issues: pacifism, non-interventionism, and non-alignment are placed, namely, at the center of their worldview (Coticchia & Vignoli, 2020). 

Both parties were in opposition during the PD-governed XVII legislature (2013-2018). In these five years, they fueled the anti-EU narrative: they did not only exert criticism of EU’s governance and policies as in Berlusconi’s discourse, but they did start questioning Italy’s international positioning (M5S always supported anti-NATO instances) and Italy’s Eurozone and eventually European Union’s membership. Moreover, Salvini’s Lega had momentum during 2015’s migrant crisis: the emergency served as an additional argument to blame the EU for the lost sovereignty. Even if, according to Mudde’s definition, the two parties did not share the same vision of who the pure people were, they certainly had the same perspective on the ‘corrupt elite’: both can be defined as anti-establishment sovereigntist parties (Coticchia, 2021). These characteristics are the premises of the apparently unthinkable alliance between a PRRP and a populist post-ideologist party. Conte I cabinet demonstrates how populism itself, even when not attached to a core ideology, can be the ideological ground for commonly endorsed instances (D’Alimonte in Coticchia, 2021). Populists are proven to use foreign policy subjects in such a way as to create a perceived sense of crisis in domestic constituencies to catalyze political consensus. They often do not have a clear foreign policy view and tend to act on a case by case basis to maximize domestic success (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020). 

Since the beginning of the legislature, the relationship with the EU has been troublesome. As the executive took office, the President of the Republic, Mattarella set the red line of not challenging Eurozone membership. Conte I did not do it explicitly, but the 2019 Budget Law has been the loophole to challenge EU rules. To satisfy their electoral promises, the two parties included fiscal policies whose implementation would have largely exceeded the deficit limits required by the Treaties. In the end, to avoid the infraction procedure, the government revised – even if only partially – the Finance Bill, but the confrontation with the Commission represented an ‘unprecedented conflict’ with the EU (Fabbrini and Zgaga in Coticchia, 2021). In October 2018, Salvini announced the closing of Italian harbors to NGOs disembarks and refused to allow asylum seekers onto Italian soil. The minister of Internal Affairs and Deputy prime minister justified the decrees with the claim of ‘taking back sovereignty and control on national borders. Even if mainly vocal and symbolic, these measures created further fractures with the EU. The populist parties did not only address their sonant and disrupting actions to EU institutions but to historical partners. Di Maio, the minister of Economic Development, Labor, and Social Policies, visited the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement leader to express support for the protest’s instances. This event led to a diplomatic crisis between Paris and Rome: Macron recalled the ambassador from Rome. Presid ent Mattarella had to intervene to solve the diplomatic tensionbetween the two countries. 

The intrinsic uncertainty and volatility of populist foreign policy could – theoretically, undermine the EU’s common actions (Balfour, 2016). However, in the Yellow-Green case, this only partially held. Indeed, Mattarella’s firm stances guaranteed substantial continuity to pro-European viewpoints. Thus, even if the relations with Moscow and Beijing were, in fact, the main breaking point with the past Italian system of alliances, they turned out to be vocal rather than concrete. Namely, the populist government vocally showed the will to block the EU’s sanctions against the country, but it eventually voted for them (Coticchia, 2021). The relationship with China did instead experience a concrete evolution with the Yellow-Green government: in March 2019, Italy was the first Western European country to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with China. The government wanted to leverage this as a soft balancing (Pope in Giurlando, 2021) strategy as they believed a privileged relationship with China would have given Italy leverage on European bargaining. Nevertheless, the MoU, together with all other foreign policy positions, ended up weakening Italy’s influence on EU policy making. 

The COVID-19 pandemic, The War in Ukraine and Meloni’s rise to power 

During Conte II (2019-2021), we saw a partial increase in accountability of M5S. Especially during the first stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, it emphasized its role in negotiations for the establishment of the EU Recovery Plan. Conversely, Salvini aligned with other international populists (e.g., Trump and Bolsonaro) in fueling the allegations around COVID-19’s origins and criticizing lockdown measures. He attacked the EU for the initial scarce financial support and the legal mechanisms controlling the use of EU funds. The differences in ‘naming and shaming’ were due to the different institutional roles (governing vs. opposition) (Bobba & Hubé, 2021). 

Despite the conflicts, both parties supported Draghi’s government of ‘national unity.’ However, the large coalition started to show resounding cracks after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. If M5S has always supported anti-NATO instances, Salvini failed in distancing himself from past Putin’s praises and celebration. Moreover, M5S also showed resistance to sending weapons to Ukraine, justified by the party's long-standing pacifist claim. 

After Draghi's resignation, electoral pools gave Meloni’s FDI as Italy’s first party. Being in opposition, she has been able to build political consensus around her populist radical right rhetoric, also exploiting coalition allies' (Salvini and Berlusconi) decline. In addition, Meloni successfully distanced herself from past Putin admiration. From the beginning of the Russian invasion, she unequivocally supported Ukraine, endorsing Draghi’s choice to send weapons to the country and advocating for NATO unity and an increase in the European expenditure on defence. In the 25 September 2022 elections, she gained 26% consensus, becoming the first female prime minister of the country. As CNN titled the day after the elections, Meloni emerged as the “most radical-right prime minister since Mussolini.” Not all scholars agree on the populist nature of FDI: indeed, the party has traceable roots in the post-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano, and the party’s inner circle (Meloni included) has ample activist careers in the young section of the party. However, the party described itself as populist, and Meloni is clearly a populist leader. Mudde (2007), the foremost scholar on far-right populism, also classified FDI as a member of the PRRP family. 

During the electoral campaign, Meloni adopted a milder tone to the EU-elite to present herself as a reliable partner in Europe. The party has long abandoned the harsh Eurosceptic rhetoric but, when in government, continued to criticize the EU on issues like migration and environmental policies as a way to interfere and damage national interests. At the time of writing, there is an open conflict with the EU on Italy’s beach license regulations, and foremostly the risk that Recovery Funds' third tranche is blocked due to government nonconformity. Meloni also expressed a clear position on EU enlargement: recently, during a ministerial meeting on the Western Balkan region, she advocated for higher EU integration in the Western Balkans due to their strategic positions for security concerns. In the speech, she claimed the aim of the current Italian government "is bringing more Italy in the region, from a political, economic, and cultural point of view." 

The primary open conflict with the EU is though on LGBTQ+ rights. FDI and LSP have repeatedly shown support – and admiration – for how Fidesz's Hungary and Law and Justice's Poland have been managing family policies. In early April 2023, Italy did not join the other 15 European countries (Germany and France included) to back European Commission legal action against Hungary over a 2021 law discriminating against LGBTQ+ minorities. This lack of support followed a previously open dispute with the EU after a ministerial circular denying same-sex parents recognition as legal guardians. On 28th March, “the European Parliament’s plenary backed an amendment 'condemning' the actions of the Italian government, arguing that they discriminate against same-sex couples” (Politico, 2023). 

Conclusion 

Overall, in the last three decades populist forces made antagonistic and exclusivist narratives, symbolism, and harsh tones the mainstream elements of the political discourse. The reasons behind the populist endemic in the Bel Paese are out of the scope of this essay. Yet, it is crucial to highlight the intrinsic interrelations between Italian populism spread and EU dynamics. All forces examined (Berlusconi’s FI, Lega, M5S, FDI) found the food for their domestic consensus in their ability to shape EU-relevant events (Maastricht Treaty, Eurocrisis, Migration Crisis, Covid Pandemic, Ukraine War) in a national-interest damaging view to appeal to the Italian electorate. Independently of their ‘core ideology’ (liberal, pure anti-establishment, radical right), the populists have identified the ‘corrupt elite’ in the EU supranational institutions and elevated themselves as the sole able to carry Italian instances in the international context. 

Berlusconi paved the way to use of foreign policy for domestic purposes. He was the architect of the massification of foreign policy matters. He reshaped diplomatic conduct: he legitimized gaffes (even vulgar) and out-of-the-etiquette behaviors to the eye of the Italian public opinion. He enhanced the prime minister role and privileging bilateral relations. Conte I cabinet completed the populist centralization of foreign policy communication and implementation at the end of political figures rather than field experts: the Deputy prime ministers often took positions on affairs outside their ministerial competencies. Additionally, the Yellow-Green government made concrete attempts to distance Italy from the historical set of alliances (conflicts by the EU and France) by getting closer to Russia, China, and the Visegrád Group countries - at least namely. Indeed, as the literature suggests, populist parties try to escape direct confrontation with relevant countries to avoid damage to their constituencies and to avoid excessive international isolation (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020): the government's intentions and claims proved to be more vocal than actual (except for the signing of the MoU). It is untimely to gauge Meloni’s foreign policy, but this first year of government is aligned with scholars’ hypotheses on the link between populism and foreign policy. She centralized foreign policy in her hands. She challenged – even if partially (i.e., the firm alignment with NATO) – Italy’s international placement, seeking new alliances with Eastern European countries (Hungary and Poland), continuing what Salvini tried to do in Conte I but, at the time, except for mutual support, there have been no official bilateral initiatives (Coticchia, 2021). 

Nonetheless, thanks to the solid government majority, Meloni could succeed in what all other Italian populist parties have failed: concretely undermining EU normative power and exporting goals with factual and long-lasting resilience-building endeavors (Cadier & Lequesne, 2020). Meloni's government is adopting an iron fist on migration and an illiberal position on LGBTQ+ rights. This anti-liberal attitude is particularly relevant in damaging the EU's credibility and legitimacy: Italy is not only the third biggest member state but one of the Union's founding members. By moving away from Western European countries and getting closer to Hungary and Poland, Meloni could initiate a process of ‘Europeanization of illiberal values’ (Rivera Escartin, 2020) on a larger scale due to Italy's weight in European politics and being the country a global political trends forerunner. If this is not the case, Meloni’s far-right populist policies and rhetoric will relegate Italy to a marginal role in the EU foreign policy and decision-making.